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1 Introduction 
 
Many commodities are sold both through long-term contracts and on spot markets.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that most forward contracts last for many spot market trading periods. For 
example, two-thirds (by volume) of the gas trades reported in Britain on December 3, 2004 were 
for deliveries spread over a month or more, as were more than 90% of the electricity trades 
(Heren, 2004a,b). Fifty percent of California winegrape producers have contracts of more than 
one year with an average length of 3.5 years, the most frequent contract lengths being 3, 5 and 10 
years (Goodhue et al., 1999). In the U.S. agricultural industry, many contracts are signed for 3 
months (20% for cattle and 35% for poultry) or for 3-12 months (80% and 49% respectively) 
(USDA, 1993). For non-ferrous metals traded on the London Metal Exchange similarly, 
contracts range from one day to many years (Slade and Tille, 2004 or www.lme.com).  
The seminal result on the interaction between spot and forward markets (Allaz and Vila, 
1993) is that the presence of a forward market will make the spot market more competitive – 
firms are competing only over the unsold portion of the overall demand, and face a more elastic 
residual demand curve. More recently, however, some authors have suggested ways in which 
forward markets could be used to make the spot market less competitive. One possibility is that 
firms could buy in the forward market to increase their exposure to the spot market, and make 
their residual demand less elastic (Mahenc and Salanié, 2004). Another is that contracts could 
increase the likelihood and severity of collusion (Ferreira, 2003, Le Coq, 2004, Liski and 
Montero, 2006). The key intuition of these papers is that a firm which defects from a collusive 
agreement will not be able to capture the demand already covered by contract sales. Compared to 
the case with no contracts, this reduces the gains from defection without changing the 
punishment path, and therefore makes collusion easier to sustain.  An important feature of these 
papers is that the contracts studied only last for a single spot period. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate how the length of forward contracts (i.e. the 
number of spot periods with delivery commitment) affects the firms’ ability to collude on the 
spot market.  We show that the longer the contracts last, the more difficult it is to sustain 
collusion.  At the same time, however, every firm can sustain some collusive price above 
marginal cost for any length of contracts.  This includes firms that would not be able to collude 
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in the absence of contracts – we show that they will need to cover a high proportion of their 
output with contracts to make collusion possible. 
The mechanism works as follows. We adapt the setting used in Liski and Montero (2006) 
where firms repeatedly alternate between selling contracts and competing in price on the spot 
market, but with several spot periods between each round of forward trading.1  A contract is thus 
an agreement where a firm (buyer) commits to sell (to buy) a fixed quantity at a fixed price in 
each of a number of spot market periods. The length of the contract is defined as the number of 
spot periods for which the agreement stands, and is set exogenously. Assume that firms collude 
on a price above marginal cost with a trigger strategy. Any contract reduces the demand to be 
met in the spot market, reducing the short-term gain from defection, and therefore makes 
collusion more attractive. The contracts affect the payoff during the punishment phase, however. 
As soon as deviation occurs, the punishment is to offer the competitive price in the spot market 
in every period afterwards, and sell contracts at this price from the next contract round onwards. 
This punishment immediately affects profits in the spot market, but the deviating firm still 
receives profits from its contracts, until the next contract round. While the defecting firm cannot 
take away the sales its rival has covered by contracts in the period in which it defects, its rival 
cannot take away the sales the firm has covered by contracts made before the defection. This 
reduces the severity of the punishment that can be inflicted for defection. The longer the 
contracts last for, the greater the reduction of the punishment. The contracted quantities act as a 
“protection” during the length of the contract. The paper discusses how these two effects – the 
lower gain from deviation and the reduced punishment afterwards – interact as the length of the 
contracts varies. We call the first effect the “gain-cutting effect” and the second the “protection 
effect”.  
While we are not aware of other papers that have paid attention to the length of the 
contract in an oligopolistic game, Liski and Montero (2006) briefly consider what would happen 
if firms traded one-period contracts many periods in advance, which is in some ways equivalent 
to trading a multi-period contract. They point out that in these later periods, the contracts actually 
                                                      
1 The terminology used for forward market and spot market can differ between industries. In some industries there is 
no obvious spot or forward market, but short-term and long-term contracts coexist. Our model is applicable to the 
interaction between sales of short-term and long-term contracts in these industries, as well as to those in which there 
is a (more or less) organised spot market. However, we will always use the term “spot” market to refer to the short-
term market and forward contract to refer to the longer-term commitments. 
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make collusion harder to sustain, and so the firms would not want to sell contracts so far in 
advance that they were unable to collude.  If each period has its own contract, this is easy to 
achieve.  Their paper therefore naturally concentrates on the key result that short-term 
contracting makes collusion easier, and demonstrates this result with collusive paths supported 
by contracts sold a single period in advance.   
In practice, firms may not be able to choose exactly how far in advance (or for how long) 
they sell their output.  Market conventions generally dictate that forward contracts will last for a 
week, a month, a quarter or a year. Moreover, liquidity is concentrated in the contracts which are 
closest to delivery. We therefore assume that a firm cannot offer, say, an eleven-month contract 
by selling a year-long contract and simultaneously buying an identical contract for the final 
month of that year.  The firm might be able to unwind part of its commitment later in the year, 
once there is more liquidity in the market for the final month.  This would only affect the firm’s 
payoffs if it happened before a deviation has occurred, however, and we will show that any 
deviation will take place at the start of the contract’s life.  The firms in our model have to take 
the length of contracts as given, but still wish to maintain a collusive equilibrium. 
We are considering forward contracts for physical delivery, which remove part of the 
market demand from a defecting firm.  If the firms had sold contracts that are financially settled, 
such as most futures contracts, the defector would still be able to cover the entire physical market 
demand at a defection price below the collusive price.  Furthermore, the defector would still 
receive the higher price on that part of their output covered by contracts, raising their deviation 
profits, relative to the situation with no contracts.2  Financially settled contracts therefore make 
collusion harder than the forward contracts we study. 
With different contract lengths and an infinitely repeated game we offer a general setup 
described in the next section. Section 3 gives the general conditions for collusion to be 
sustainable. Section 4 shows how the discount factor needed to sustain the collusive price varies 
with the proportion of the collusive output covered by contracts, and the duration of those 
contracts. This illustrates the two effects at work. Section 5 discusses how the highest sustainable 
collusive price varies with the discount factor, the proportion of output sold through contracts, 
and their duration, and shows that firms can maintain some collusive price above marginal cost 
                                                      
2 This distinction is also noted by Liski and Montero (2006), footnote 5. 
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for any positive discount factor, given appropriate contracts. Section 6 discusses the firms’ 
optimal choice of contracts, and section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2 The model 
 
Consider two firms, 1 and 2, who produce a homogeneous good with a constant marginal cost c 
and no capacity constraints. They can sell their good on either the contract market or the spot 
market. The firms have a common discount factor, δ. 
Timing. Firms compete in price repeatedly on the spot market (taking place in all periods t 
=1,2,3,...). There is a contract round, which takes no time, before the first spot period. The 
contracts sold in this round will last for ! > 0  spot periods. As soon as they expire, there is 
another contract round, followed by λ spot periods, and so on.3  
Demand. In each period, the demand is given by D(p), which is a decreasing and continuous 
function of the spot price p. This demand can be met either by sales in the spot market or by 
commitments made under forward contracts.  The price paid for forward contracts does not 
affect this demand – if the prices differ (for example, a firm defecting from collusion would set a 
spot price below the contract price), buyers effectively receive a lump sum gain or loss from 
their contract holdings, but there is no income effect.   
Contract market. In each contract round, the two firms simultaneously choose the amount of 
forward contracts they want to sell in the forward market that call for delivery of an equal 
volume in each of the next λ spot periods. Payment is made at the time(s) of delivery, avoiding 
the need to use different amounts of discounting for spot and contract sales. We treat λ as fixed 
exogenously, governed by market conventions.  The firms’ contract positions become common 
knowledge at the end of each contract round (i.e., before the first spot period for which those 
contracts apply).  
                                                      
3 Our main qualitative results would also hold if contracts were traded before every spot period, with 1/λ  of the 
stock being renewed each time.  The gain-cutting effect would be unchanged, while the protection effect would be 
weakened, as the number of contracts held during the punishment phase would fall continuously.  In practice, 
however, many industries have contracts which start on standard dates, such as the first day of the month, which fits 
the simpler formulation we use.  The qualitative results would also hold if some contracts were traded further in 
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No arbitrage. We assume that the contracts will only be accepted by purchasers if the contract 
price is equal to the expected price in the spot market. In other words, the firms will be able to 
sell contracts at a particular collusive price, if and only if they will be able to sustain this price in 
the spot market, given their discount factors and contract sales.  
Spot market. In each spot period, the firms simultaneously bid prices, and the firm with the 
lower price serves the entire spot demand – the total demand at that price, less the forward 
commitments by each firm. If this would be negative (demand at the spot price is less than the 
forward sales), there are no spot market transactions.4  We assume an efficient-rationing rule; if 
the firms submit the same price bid, they share the spot demand equally. 
General profit functions. Aggregate profits are given by ! p( ) = p ! c( )D p( )  and are 
assumed to be single peaked with a unique maximum at ! pm( ) . Let ! m = ! pm( )( )  denote the 
per-period profit earned by a monopoly firm. Let ! c = ! pc( )( )  denote the per-period profit 
earned by each firm from collusion at the price pc. And finally ! d = ! pd( )( )  denotes the firm’s 
profit during the deviation period, taking its spot and contracted output together. 
 
 
3. Sustaining Collusion 
 
We restrict our attention to stationary collusive agreements supported by trigger strategies. This 
greatly simplifies the analysis and its exposition and does not restrict the scope of the results.5  
The firms are aiming to sustain a collusive price of pc > c. We assume that they will never wish 
                                                                                                                                                                              
advance (e.g. March contracts were traded in January), but the protection effect would be greater, lasting until all the 
contracts already signed at the time of a deviation had expired.  
4 This will not be the case in equilibrium, or along the deviation paths we consider, but we state it for completeness. 
5 Players revert to the static Nash equilibrium and remain there forever after any deviation. Exactly as in a repeated 
Bertrand competition, unrelenting trigger strategies are "optimal punishments" in our setting, since the players are at 
their security levels. Expressed differently, no complex punishment mechanism can enlarge the set of sustainable 
equilibria (Abreu, 1986). We could also have considered other type of punishment strategies, like forgiving trigger 
strategies, that prescribes collusion in the first period, and then n  periods of defection for every defection of any 
player, followed by reverting to cooperation no matter what has occurred during the punishment phase. It would 
have however complicated the exposition of the results by adding on extra variable and would have not changed our 
general result. 
 6 
to collude on a price greater than pm, since increasing the price above this level would reduce 
their per-period profits, as well as making collusion harder to sustain. 
In the first contract round, each firm offers a quantity of long-term contracts, at the 
collusive price pc, to sell part (or none, or all) of the output it would produce if it shared the 
(overall) market equally at the collusive price – that output is given by D(pc)/2.  If both firms 
have followed the collusive equilibrium so far, then in each spot period, the firm will bid a spot 
price of pc, sharing the spot market demand equally with the other firm.  
If at any point in time anyone is detected cheating in any previous contract round or spot 
period, then both firms will bid marginal cost, c, in each subsequent spot period. In every 
subsequent contract round after a deviation has occurred, the firms will sell an arbitrary volume 
of contracts, at the same price, c, as long as their combined sales do not exceed the market 
demand at marginal cost, D(c).  
It is convenient to work in terms of the proportion of output sold in the contract market, 
rather than its volume. Following Liski and Montero (2006), x∈[0,1] corresponds to the 
proportion of contract sales, relative to the total output the firm would sell in the collusive 
equilibrium (spot and forward sales).  For a given collusive price, there is a one-to-one 
relationship between x and the volume of contracts (which remains the variable actually chosen 
by the firms). We rule out over-contracting (x > 1) or forward purchases (x < 0). 
We now investigate whether these strategies can sustain collusion against an optimal 
deviation. In principle, a firm can deviate by either increasing its forward sales on the contract 
round or undercutting its spot price. Deviating during the contract round is never optimal, as 
shown by Liski and Montero (2006). Contracts are fully observable, and buyers know the firms’ 
strategies. If one firm deviates in a contract round, the spot price in every succeeding spot period 
will be equal to c. Knowing this, no buyer would pay more than c in the forward market to a 
seller that is attempting to deviate from its collusive strategy. The profit from deviation will thus 
be zero. Any collusive strategy that gives a profit of more than zero is thus proof against 
collusion occurring in a contract round. We can thus state: 
 
Lemma 1. It is never optimal to deviate during a contract round. 
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Thus, we need only to concentrate on deviations in the spot market. If there were no contract 
sales, by slightly undercutting pc ! c, pm( "# , a firm can earn approximately the aggregate 
collusive profit. Given that at the opening of the spot market in period t there is an already 
secured supply of xD pc( )  units coming from firms’ forward obligations signed in the most 
recent contract round, this may not be the optimal deviation in our model.  
Define pRm as the monopoly price associated with the residual demand6, and given by  
 pRm = pRm x, pc( ) ! argmax p " c( ) D p( ) " xD pc( )( )  (1) 
The optimal deviation price is then defined as  
 pd = pd (x, pc ) ! min pc " ! , pRm#$ %&  (2) 
The firm’s spot market profits from charging the optimal deviation price are given by sdp , where  
 ! sd = ! sd x, pc, pd( ) = pd ! c( ) D pd( ) ! xD pc( )( )  (3) 
The firm’s total profits in the spot period during which it deviates are thus equal to 
 ! d = ! d (x, pc, pd ) = ! sd + x! c  (4) 
In the punishment phase, starting just after the deviation period, the firms offer c on the spot 
market forever and offer forward contracts at that price in all following contract rounds. As a 
result, every subsequent spot profit is equal to zero. However, until the current contracts expire, 
firms still sell their contracted quantities at the collusive price, pc. The punishment does not 
affect those quantities until the next contract round starts.  
This affects the optimal timing of a deviation. The present value of the profits from 
collusion continued forever equals πc/(1–δ) in any spot market period. This includes per-period 
profits of xπc from forward sales and (1-x) πc from sales in the spot market. The present value of 
the profits from a deviation depends on the number of spot market periods remaining before the 
next contract round. Consider a deviation with ! ! 1,2,..."{ }  periods remaining until the next 
contract round. We can write the profits during the punishment phase starting after the deviation 
period, discounted to the deviation period, as x! c " tt=1
#!1
" . The present value of the overall 
profits from deviation is thus equal to 
                                                      
6 We assume that p ! c( ) D p( ) ! xD pc( )( )  is a single peaked function with a unique maximum pRm. 
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 PV deviation = ! d + x! c " !"
#
1!"  (5) 
This allows us to state: 
 
Lemma 2. A deviation is most profitable when it occurs in the spot period immediately after a 
contract round. 
 
Proof: Immediate, from inspection of equation (5), which is maximised when τ is at the highest 
possible value, implying ! = " . Since the profits from continued collusion do not depend on 
time, choosing the highest level of deviation profits is sufficient to choose the best time to 
deviate. ■ 
 
Using the one-stage deviation principle for infinite-horizon games, the collusive agreement 
described above is sustainable as a subgame-perfect equilibrium as long as neither firm has an 
incentive at any period to defect unilaterally from the collusive agreement. The punishment 
phase (i.e., reversion to marginal cost forever) is subgame perfect, so we need to find the 
condition under which deviation from the collusive path is not profitable for either firm. Setting 
! = "  in equation (5), this condition is equivalent to 
 
! c
1!" " !
d +
" !"#
1!" x!
c  (6) 
The first part of the right hand side of the inequality (6) gives the first-period deviation profit, 
which includes both profit from the residual spot demand and the forward sales in the deviation 
period. The second part of the right hand side gives the profits that the firm will obtain from its 
forward sales after the deviation occurs until the period immediately before the next contract 
round. 
Using ! d = ! sd + x! c , equation (6) can be rewritten as: 
 1! 1!!"( ) x"# $%! c & 1!"( )! sd  (7) 
Let us define 
 h x,!,", pc( ) = 1! 1!!"( ) x"# $%! c ! 1!"( )! sd  (8) 
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We define the minimum discount factor as ! = ! x,!, pc( )  such that h x,!,", pc( ) = 0 . Hence 
we can state  
 
Proposition 1. The grim trigger strategies described above constitute a subgame perfect 
equilibrium if and only if ! ! ! x,!, pc( ) , where h x,!,", pc( ) = 0 . 
 
Proof. The collusion is sustainable for any discount factor satisfying inequality (7). From the 
definition of h (equation (8)), we know that this is equivalent to h x,!,", pc( ) ! 0 . We also have: 
 
!h x,!,", pc( )
!!
= "!""1x# c + # sd > 0 #pc > c  (9) 
This implies that any discount factor greater than !  will give h > 0 . ■ 
 
Proposition 1 sets out the sufficient condition for a collusive equilibrium. Forward contracts 
affect this equilibrium in two ways.  First there is a pro-collusive effect (captured by the variable 
! d  in the inequality (6)) which we call the gain-cutting effect. Second there is a pro-competitive 
effect (captured by the term (! !!" ) (1!!)x# c  in the inequality (6)) which we call the 
protection effect. 
Assume that firms have signed contracts ( x > 0 ). A firm which defects from a collusive 
agreement will not be able to capture the demand already covered by contract sales. This reduces 
the gains from defection, for a given collusive price and discount factor, allowing the firms to 
sustain a higher collusive price, or making collusion possible with a lower discount factor. We 
say that the forward sales have a gain-cutting effect that increases with the amount of forward 
sales (because we have !! d !x < 0 ). The more forward sales there are, the less the deviation 
profit is, which tends to make it easier to collude. 
 Forward sales have a second impact on collusion, however, if they last for more than one 
period. While the defecting firm cannot take away the sales its rival has covered by contracts in 
the period in which it defects, its rival cannot take away the sales the firm has covered by 
contracts made before the defection. Hence if λ > 1, a firm that defects in the first spot period 
after a contract round will continue to receive the fixed forward price for part of its output, until 
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the next contract round occurs. This reduces the severity of the punishment that can be inflicted 
for defection. The longer the length of the contracts, the greater this reduction, and the more 
protected are the firms. This protection effect increases with the length of the contract (since the 
coefficient (! !!" ) (1!!)  increases in λ) as well as with the contracted quantity. 
It is important to notice that the two effects do not play at the same time. The gain-cutting 
effect appears (during the deviation period) before the protection effect. Moreover the gain-
cutting effect always exists as soon as x > 0 , while the protection effect only appears when 
! > 1 . The overall impact on the sustainability of collusion depends upon the interaction of the 
two effects. 
In the following sections, we discuss different implications of this proposition, 
concentrating first on the minimum discount factor, then the collusive price and finally the 
optimal contracted quantity.   
 
4. The critical discount factor 
We explore how the minimum discount factor !  varies with the length of the contract (λ) 
(proposition 2) and with the contracted quantity (x) (proposition 3). Before exploring the general 
results of Proposition 1, we discuss two simple examples that allow us to relate to previous 
literature. 
 
No contracting case (Repeated Bertrand game). Assume that firms hold no contracts x = 0( )  and 
agree to collude on the monopoly price; the game is identical to the traditional repeated price 
game. By sticking to the agreement, a firm receives ! m / 2  which corresponds to half the 
aggregate monopoly profit. When x = 0 , the optimal deviation is to undercut the collusive price by 
a fractional amount, capturing the entire market demand at this price, and obtaining twice the 
collusive profit in that period. In all future periods, the unilateral deviation triggers retaliation from 
the other firm. As a result, in all subsequent periods firm i earns the static Nash equilibrium profits, 
that is ! c( ) = 0 . We can rewrite the inequality (7) as ! m 1!"( ) " 2!
m . From Proposition 1, if 
there are no contracts, firms can sustain the monopoly price if their discount factor is ½ or more, 
and cannot sustain any price above marginal cost for any lower discount factor (Tirole, 1988). 
With no contracting, neither the gain-cutting effect nor the protection effect exists.  This gives us: 
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Lemma 3.  A discount factor of ½ is the minimum needed to sustain collusion at any price between 
marginal cost and the monopoly price, for any contract length, if no contracts have been sold:  
 ! 0,", pc( ) = 12 !", p
c " c, pm#$ %&  (10) 
 
Proof.  As discussed above and in Tirole (1988). ■ 
 
One period contracting case. Assume firms offer one-period contracts ( x > 0  and ! = 1 ) and 
agree to collude on the monopoly price pm, so that ! c = ! m 2 . It is straightforward to show that 
whenever x>0 and pc = pm  the optimal deviation price is the residual monopoly price pRm defined 
by equation (1). Since contracts only last for one period, the punishment phase starts immediately 
after the deviation period. As a result, in all subsequent periods firm i earns the static Nash 
equilibrium profits, that is ! c( ) = 0 , and there is no protection effect.  Collusion is sustainable 
whenever ! m (1!") " ! sd + x! m . Recall that from equation (3) we have! sd = 2 1! x( )! m , and 
so the condition can be rewritten as 1 (1!!) " 2 ! x .  Since the gain-cutting effect becomes 
stronger as the level of contracting rises, the critical discount factor is strictly decreasing in the 
level of one-period contracting. This explains the main result with one-period contracting (studied 
first by Liski and Montero, 2006): forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that 
otherwise would not be possible. When we allow for longer contract lengths this result does not 
always hold. 
 
General case. Returning to the general case, we first state several derivatives of the function h 
which we will use shortly: 
 
Lemma 4.  The function h x,!,", pc( ) = 1! 1!!"( ) x"# $%! c ! 1!"( )! sd  has the following 
derivatives: 
i) h! = "!"!1x# c + # sd > 0, "pc > c   
ii) h! = x" c#! ln #( ) < 0  
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iii) hx = ! 1!!"( )! c ! 1!"( )"! sd / "x  and hx > 0 for x = 0, c <  pc ≤ pm and δ ≤ ½.  
iv) hxx = ! 1!!( )
!2! sd
!x2
! 0 . 
 
Proof.  Parts (i) and (ii) can be proved by inspection, since profits are positive for pc > c , and 
1δ < .  For part (iii), differentiating equation (3), we obtain!! sd / !x = " pd " c( )D pc( ) .  With 
no contracts and a collusive price (pc) of pm or less (but more than c), the optimal deviation is to 
undercut pc by a fractional amount, and we have  
hx = 1!!( ) pc ! ! ! c( )D pc( ) ! 1!!"( )12 p
c ! c( )D pc( ) , which gives us  
 hx = 1!!( ) ! 12 1!!
"( )"#$
%
&'
D pc( ) pc ! c( ) .  Since 1!!"( ) < 1 , this is positive for δ ≤ ½.   
For part (iv), differentiating hx we obtain hxx = ! 1!!( ) !
2! sd
!x2
= 1!!( ) !p
d
!x
D( pc ) . If the optimal 
deviation is to is to undercut pc by a fractional amount, then !p
d
!x
= 0 .  If it is to set pd = pRm, then 
!pd
!x
< 0  and so we have hxx ! 0 .■ 
 
The results in Lemma 4 allow us to state:   
 
Proposition 2. The critical discount factor is strictly increasing in the length of the contract. 
 
 Proof. By the implicit function theorem, we have d! d" = !h" h! . From Lemma 4(i) and (ii), 
h! > 0 and h! < 0 .  This means that the critical discount factor d  is strictly increasing in the 
length of the contract (d! d" > 0 ).■ 
 
With one period contracting, the firm knows that in every period after its defection its profits will 
be reduced to zero. Proposition 2 arises because if the contract lasts for more than one period 
(! > 1 ), a firm that defects in the first spot period after a contract round will continue to receive 
the fixed forward price for part of its output, until the next contract round occurs. This reduces 
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the severity of the punishment that the deviating firm will receive – the longer the contracts last, 
the less the firm’s profits will be reduced. Hence the greater the length of the contract, the longer 
the firm is protected against harsh punishment. This increases the temptation to deviate.  
 
Proposition 3. The critical discount factor required to sustain collusion at the monopoly price is 
quasiconvex in the proportion of contracted output, and falls as it increases from zero.  
 
Proof. By the implicit function theorem, we have d! dx = !hx h! .  From Lemma 4(i), h! > 0 . 
With no contracting, Lemma 3 shows that the critical discount factor is ½, and hence Lemma 
4(iii) implies hx > 0 .  This means that d! dx < 0  at x = 0.  As Lemma 4(iv) also shows that 
hxx < 0 , we find that as x increases, hx will fall.  If it eventually becomes negative, we then 
obtain d! dx > 0 .  This establishes the quasi convexity of the critical discount factor. ■  
 
The level of contracted output affects the two effects in opposite directions. When the contracted 
quantity increases, the residual demand decreases and therefore the gains from deviation are 
lower (the gain-cutting effect becomes stronger). At the same time, when the contracted quantity 
increases, the forward profit increases, implying that the protection effect becomes stronger. This 
gives more incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. Since the two effects are working 
in opposite directions, we get an ambiguous overall impact on the sustainability of collusion. The 
gain-cutting effect is stronger and collusion becomes easier to achieve when firms have short-
term contracts. With linear demand and one-period contracts, the critical discount factor falls 
until x = 1.  For large and long-term contract volumes, the impact on the protection effect 
dominates and it becomes harder to sustain collusion.  
 
 
5. The collusive price  
 
In the model without contracts, the collusive price is not a significant choice variable, for if firms 
are able to sustain collusion, they can sustain it at the monopoly price.  In our model, this result 
no longer holds.  In this section, we characterise the relationship between the firms’ discount 
factor, their contracts and the maximum collusive price that the firms can sustain, which we 
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define as the highest value pc = pc x,!,"( )  such that h x,!,", pc( ) = 0 .  First, we consider cases 
where the optimal deviation is still to undercut the collusive price by no more than a fraction.  
This will be the case as long as the proportion of the collusive output covered by contracts is not 
too great.  We show that any firm can support collusion at some price above marginal cost, 
provided that it has covered more than a given amount of its output with contracts (proposition 
4).  Second, we consider the cases when the optimal deviation involves a greater reduction in 
price, which will be the case for high levels of contract cover.  We show that every firm can also 
support some collusive price strictly above marginal cost if it has covered all of its collusive 
output with contracts (proposition 5).  We then characterise the relationship between the 
maximum sustainable collusive price, the discount factor, the length of contracts and the 
proportion of output covered by contracts between these two levels (propositions 6 and 7).  Our 
ultimate aim is to find the highest collusive price that a firm can sustain.   
We start by asking whether firms would deviate with a small or a large reduction in the 
spot price. If the collusive price and the level of contracting are not too high, the residual 
monopoly price will be greater than the collusive price. In that case, the optimal deviation will be 
to undercut the collusive price by a small amount, as it is when firms are trying to collude on the 
monopoly price with no contracts.  Otherwise, the residual monopoly price in a spot market 
reduced in size by forward contracts will be below the collusive price, and the optimal deviation 
will be to undercut the collusive price by a large amount. 
From this point onwards, we assume that !2D( p) / !p2 ! 0 . We already defined 
pd x, pc( )  as the optimal deviation price given pc and x where 
pd x, pc( ) = min pc ! !, pRm(x, pc ){ } .  We define the threshold at which the optimal deviation 
price changes between the two possibilities, xˆ pc( ) ! 0,1[ ]  such that pRm xˆ pc( ), pc( ) = pc , 
which gives us: 
 pd = pd x, pc( ) =
pc ! ! if x " xˆ pc( )
pRm x, pc( ) if x > xˆ pc( )
#
$
%
&%
 (11) 
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where xˆ p p ! pm( ) = 0 , xˆ c( ) = 1  and 
!xˆ pc( )
!pc < 0  (which we confirm in the appendix).  We 
also define pˆc x( )  as the collusive price for which pRm x, pˆc x( )( ) = pˆc .   
We call the area where x ! xˆ pc( ) region 1, and the area where x > xˆ pc( ) region 2. The 
distinction between these two regions is important, because the firm’s spot market profits after 
deviation are different. In both regions, the firm’s forward profits are equal to ! f = x! c , and its 
spot market profits from collusion are equal to ! s = 1! x( )! c .  In region 1, the optimal 
deviation of slightly undercutting pc gives the firm double the spot market profits that it would 
gain from collusion. We use this straightforward relationship in the proof of: 
 
Proposition 4: Collusion is sustainable at any price between marginal cost and pˆc x( )  if firms 
cover at least !x !,!( )! 0,1!" ) of their output with contracts, where 
!x !,"( ) = 0
!x !,"( ) = 1! 2!
!" +1! 2!
for! ! 1
2
for! < 1
2
. 
For firms with δ < ½, !x !,!( )! 0,1!" ) is decreasing in δ and increasing in λ. 
 
Proof. Consider firms with contract cover of x which attempt to set a collusive price of 
pc ! pˆc x( ) .  By the definition of pˆc x( ) , the optimal deviation is to slightly undercut cp  , so 
that the deviating firm receives ! sd = 2 1! x( )! c  as its spot market profits. From inequality (7), 
collusion is sustainable if and only if !
c
1!" " 2 ! x( )!
c +
" !"#
1!" x!
c . We can rewrite this 
inequality as !" +1! 2!( ) x > 1! 2! , which is always true for ! !  ½ or if  
 x > !x !,"( ) = 1! 2!
!" +1! 2!  (12) 
Note that as x goes to 1, the above inequality is true for any δ > 0, whatever the value of λ.  We can 
easily obtain !!x
!!
= "
"!""1 !x + 2(1" !x)
!" + 1" 2!( )
# 0  and  !!x
!!
= "
!x!" ln!
!" + 1" 2!( )
# 0  where both inequalities 
hold for δ < ½. ■ 
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This proposition shows that forward contracts make it possible for firms to maintain some level of 
collusion at a price above marginal cost, however long those contracts last for, and however low 
their discount factor. Without contracts, collusion would only be possible for a discount factor of ½ 
or more, and so this result implies that contracts can have a pro-collusive effect, just as for Liski 
and Montero (2006). It is worth pointing out, however, that if the discount factor is low, or λ is 
large, a high level of contract cover will be required. If collusion were only possible within region 
1, this would in turn imply a relatively low level of the collusive price, since pˆc x( )  is decreasing 
in x.  However, collusion is also possible within region 2, and in fact is always sustainable at some 
price above marginal cost for a firm which has covered all of its output with contracts: 
 
Proposition 5: Collusion is sustainable at some price pc 1,!,"( ) > c if firms have covered all of 
their output, whatever the discount factor or length of contracts. 
 
Proof.  The function h 1,!,", pc( ) = !"# c ! 1!!( )! sd  when x = 1.  Expanding both of the profit 
terms, we get:  
h 1,!,", pc( ) = 12!" pc ! c( )D pc( ) ! 1!!( ) pd ! c( ) D pd( ) ! D pc( )"# $% . 
For 0h = , we need: 
1
2
!"
1!! =
pd ! c
pc ! c
D pd( ) ! D pc( )
D pc( )
. 
For low values of δ and large values of λ, the left hand side will be small.  With x = 1 and 
pc > c , we are in region 2 and so pc > pd > c .  The first fraction on the right hand side will be 
less than one, and the second can be made arbitrarily small as pc approaches c.  This ensures that 
it is possible to find a value of pc 1,!,"( ) > c  for which the equality holds. ■ 
 
We now wish to characterise the relationship between the highest collusive price that can be 
sustained within region 2 (that is, for x ! !x !,!( ),1( ) ) and other variables, but we first need to prove: 
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Lemma 5.  The function h x,!,", pc( ) = 1! 1!!"( ) x"# $%! c ! 1!"( )! sd  has a derivative 
hpc = 1! 1!!"( ) x"# $%&!
c
&pc ! 1!"( )
&! sd
&pc < 0  when h x,!,", p
c( ) ! 0  for x ! !x !,!( ),1( )  and 
pc > c .  
 
Proof. Since we are inside region 2, the optimal deviation maximises sdp with respect to pd.  
Since we are looking for sustainable collusive prices, h x,!,", pc( ) ! 0 , which gives 
1! 1!!"( ) x " (1!!)"
sd
" c
, and so hpc ! (1"!)
" sd
" c
#" c
#pc "
#" sd
#pc
$
%
&
'
(
)  if h ≥ 0.  
With !!
c
!pc =
pc " c( )
2
!D pc( )
!pc +
D pc( )
2  and 
!! sd
!pc = " p
d " c( ) x
!D pc( )
!pc
, we then have 
hpc ! (1"!) pd " c( )
D pd( )
D pc( )
#D pc( )
#pc +
D pd( ) " xD pc( )
pc"c
$
%
&&
'
(
))  if h ≥ 0. 
Because πsd (given in equation (3)) has been maximised with respect to pd, we know that 
D pd( ) ! xD pc( ) + pd!c( )
"D pd( )
"pd = 0  
This gives us: 
hpc ! (1"!) pd " c( )
#D pc( )
#pc
D pd( )
D pc( )
"
pd"c
pc"c
#D pd( )
#pd
#D pc( )
#pc
$
%
&
&
'
(
)
)
 if h ≥ 0 
Since d cp p< , the first fraction in the square brackets is greater than one, and the second fraction 
is less than one. Since !D( p) / !p < 0  and !2D( p) / !p2 ! 0 , the ratio of the two derivatives is also 
weakly less than one. The term in square brackets is therefore positive, and since dp c>  if cp c> , 0cph <  if h ≥ 0. ■ 
 
Lemma 4 (iii) can also be restated in a more general form as: 
 
Lemma 4 (iiia): If a firm with δ ≤ ½ is able to sustain collusion with contracts of  !x !,!( )  and a 
price of pˆc !x( ) , then hx = ! 1!!"( )! c ! 1!"( )"! sd / "x> 0  at this point. 
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Proof.  The proof of Lemma 4(iii) held for any situation in which the optimal deviation is to 
undercut pc by a fractional amount, and this holds, by definition, for a firm which is on the 
boundary between region 1 and region 2, as in this case. ■ 
 
We can thus state two key propositions of our paper: 
 
Proposition 6: Firms can sustain collusion at a price pc = pc x,!,"( ) > pˆc x( ) ! c  in region 2 
for all x ! !x !,!( ),1( "# .  The maximum sustainable price is quasi-concave in x, and is increasing in 
x at x = !x !,!( ) . 
 
Proof.   From Proposition 4, we know that the firms can sustain collusion with contracts of  
!x !,!( )  and a price of pˆc !x( ) , on the boundary between region 1 and region 2.  By the implicit 
function theorem, we have !pc !x = "hx hpc .  Recall from Lemma 4(iiia) that hx is positive at 
this point (since we are weakly in region 1), while Lemma 4(iv) shows that hxx is negative.  
Lemma 5 showed that hpc pc < 0 .  This implies that !p
c !x > 0 at x = !x !,!( ) and that pc  is quasi-
concave in x.    Since h x,!,", pˆc x( )( ) > 0  for all x > !x !,!( )  and hpc pc < 0 , this implies that 
pc x,!,"( ) > pˆc x( )  for all x ! !x !,!( ),1( "# . ■ 
 
Proposition 7: If collusion is possible, the maximum sustainable collusive price is increasing in 
the discount factor and decreasing in the length of contracts. 
 
Proof. By the implicit function theorem, we have !pc !! = "h! hpc .  From Lemma 4(i), we 
have 0hd > , and from Lemma 5, we have hpc pc < 0  in region 2.  This gives us !pc !! > 0 . 
Similarly, we have !pc !! = "h! hpc . From Lemma 4(ii), we have 0hl < , and from Lemma 
5(ii), we have hpc pc < 0  in region 2.  This gives us !p
c !! < 0 . ■ 
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Figure 1 illustrates these results, showing how the maximum sustainable collusive price varies 
with the discount factor and the proportion of contracts, for the case of linear demand and two-
period contracts.  The boundary between region 1 and region 2, where x = xˆ pc( ) , is shown as a 
dotted line, running between the monopoly price (with no contracts) and c (with full contract 
cover).  Firms with a discount factor of ½ can sustain collusion at the monopoly price (shown as 
a horizontal dashed line) if they have no contracts, or if they are fully contracted, and could 
actually sustain a higher price (although this would not be profitable) for intermediate levels of 
contracting.  Firms with lower discount factors can only sustain collusion in the areas bounded 
by the lines towards the bottom right of the figure.  These have a vertical segment within region 
1, and a curved segment in region 2.  The lower the discount factor, the smaller the area of 
sustainable collusion – more contracts are required, and the maximum sustainable price is lower.   
Figure 2 repeats the illustration for the case of four-period contracts.  Firms with a 
discount factor of ½ can still sustain the monopoly price if they have no contracts, but covering 
more than a small proportion of their output with contracts now makes collusion at the monopoly 
price impossible.  Firms with higher discount factors will be unable to sustain collusion at the 
monopoly price if they have sold too many contracts, while the combinations of price and 
contract cover that make collusion sustainable for firms with lower discount factors are very 
limited – but will never disappear completely.  In both figures, there is a curved dashed line 
labelled hx = 0.  This is the algebraic condition for the turning point in the relationship between 
the level of contract cover and the highest sustainable collusive price, the point at which that 
price is maximised.  Maximising the collusive price (below the monopoly price) is the key to 
maximising a firm’s profits.  
 
(Figures 1 and 2 about here) 
 
 
6. The optimal choice of contracts 
 
We are now in a position to discuss the optimal choice of contracts for firms that wish to sustain 
collusion.  Lemma 3 showed that firms with a discount factor of ½ or more need not sell any 
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contracts to sustain collusion at the monopoly price.  Proposition 3 showed that the critical 
discount factor to sustain collusion at this price is initially falling in the proportion of contracted 
output.  This implies that some firms with a discount factor of less than ½ will be able to sustain 
collusion at the monopoly price, if they sell sufficient contracts of an appropriate length.  Since 
there may be a turning point in the relationship between the critical discount factor and the 
proportion of contracts, however, there may be a maximum amount of contracts that the firm can 
sell and still remain able to sustain collusion at the monopoly price.   
This implies that firms wishing to sustain collusion at the monopoly price must sell 
contracts within a range x !,!( ),x !,!( )!"#
$
%& , where x !,!( ) =max 0,inf x h x,!,!, p
m( ) = 0!"#
$
%
&
'
()
*
+,
and 
x !,!( ) =min sup x h x,!,!, pm( ) = 0!"#
$
%
&,1
'
()
*
+,
.  The results we have already obtained for the derivatives of h 
allow us to state 
 
Proposition 8.  The lower bound on the contracts required to sustain collusion at the monopoly 
price, if greater than zero, is decreasing in the discount factor and increasing in the length of 
contracts.  The upper bound on the contracts that permit the firms to sustain collusion at the 
monopoly price, if less than one, is increasing in the discount factor and decreasing in the length 
of contracts. 
 
Proof.  From Lemma 4(i), we have 0hd >  and from Lemma 4(iiia), if the lower bound on 
contracts required for collusion is greater than zero, 0xh > .  From the implicit function 
theorem, we have dx d! = !h! hx < 0 .  From Lemma 4(ii), we have 0hl <  and so 
dx d! = !h! hx > 0 .  If there is an upper bound on the proportion of contracts consistent with 
collusion, this implies that hx < 0 , and so the signs of dx d!  and dx d!  are reversed. ■ 
 
Figure 3 (which is plotted for the case of linear demand, and λ = 2) shows the frontier beyond 
which collusion at the monopoly price is possible – the curved line rising from δ = ½.  It is clear 
that a firm with a low discount factor will lie to the left of this line and will not be able to sustain 
collusion at the monopoly price.  Without contracts, or with a low level of contract cover, they 
will not be able to sustain collusion at any price – this is the area to the left and below the dotted 
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line, which gives !x !,!( )  (characterised in proposition 4).  The third possibility is for the firms to 
sustain collusion at less than the monopoly price (but more than c).  The v-shaped region 
between the two curves shows the combinations of discount factors and contract cover for which 
this is possible.  We know that at the left-hand boundary of this region, the maximum sustainable 
price is increasing in the proportion of contracts sold.  Since (for prices below the monopoly 
price) collusive profits are rising in the collusive price, this implies that the most profitable level 
of contracts will be greater than !x !,!( ) .  This level, which we denote by x*(δ,λ), is given by the 
intersection of two conditions, where h x*,!,", pc( ) = 0 and hx* = 0 .  The thick line in figure 3 
shows these points.  Note that it starts from the region where collusion at the monopoly price is 
possible, and leaves it where the frontier is vertical – this is the point at which x !,!( ) = x !,!( ) .  
The line corresponds to the dashed line in figure 1, which passed through the highest prices at 
which collusion was sustainable for each discount factor. 
 Figure 4 shows these curves for a case with longer contracts, when λ = 4.  The area 
within which no collusion is possible has grown (proposition 4 showed that !x !,!( )  was 
increasing in λ).  The boundary for collusion at the monopoly price has shifted, raising the 
minimum discount factor required to sustain collusion at that level (as in proposition 2).  For 
firms unable to sustain this price, the profit-maximising level of contracts x*(δ,λ) (sustaining the 
highest possible collusive price below pm), is now quite close to !x !,!( )  throughout its length. 
 We know that !x !,!( )  is decreasing in δ and increasing in λ for δ < ½. Since 
x* !,!( ) > !x !,!( ) , this places a boundary on the behaviour of x*(δ,λ).  In the linear case, for x = 1, 
we can obtain hx = 0 for λ = 1 and hx < 0, for λ > 1, given that 
hx = D pc( ) 1!!( ) pd ! c( ) ! 1!!"( )12 p
c ! c( )"#$
%
&'
 and pd ! c( ) = 12 p
c ! c( ) .7  In other words, 
the collusive price is maximised with full contracting if contracts last for only one period, and 
with less than full contracting if they last for longer.  Comparing figures 3 and 4, the curves for 
x*(λ,δ) appear to move up and to the right throughout their length (that is, implying that !x*
!!
 is 
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positive for λ > 1), but the derivative is in fact negative when evaluated for a collusive price 
equal (or close) to the monopoly price.  Numerical solutions, however, show that this effect is 
localised, and for the practically important cases, x*(3,δ) > x*(2,δ) and so on.  However, it 
remains the case that a firm which was able to sustain collusion at the monopoly price for λ = 2 
and chose to do so with a high level of contracts x !,!( )( )  might need to hold fewer contracts if it 
was to maximise its sustainable collusive price for λ = 3. 
 
(Figures 3 and 4 about here) 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have shown that long-term contracts have an ambiguous impact on collusion. In some cases, 
they make collusion on a price above marginal cost possible when it would not be possible 
without them. In other cases, collusion would be possible without contracts, but becomes 
impossible (at a given price) as the level of contracting, or their length, becomes too great. We 
have shown that this ambiguity is due to the interaction of two effects, the gain-cutting effect, 
which reduces the immediate gain from defection, and the protection effect, which reduces the 
amount of punishment that deviators can receive.  The balance between the two effects changes 
as the length of the contracts increases – the longer the contracts last for, the more time the 
protection effect has to work.   
It is the protection effect that makes collusion harder for companies that would otherwise 
have been able to sustain collusion (which implies a discount factor of ½ or more).  The longer 
the contracts last for, the lower the proportion of contracts that a given firm can sell and still 
maintain collusion at the monopoly price.  Conversely, firms that could not have sustained 
collusion in the absence of contracts (those with discount factors of less than ½) benefit from the 
gain-cutting effect.  To maximise this effect, they must cover a high proportion of their output, 
and the level of cover required to sustain collusion rises with the contracts’ length, and hence the 
strength of the protection effect.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
7 In the case of full contracting and linear demand, the deviation price maximises profits against a residual demand 
curve with intercept D(pc). 
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We have taken the length of contracts as exogenous. Contracts will often last for a 
“natural” period of calendar time, such as a week, a month or a year. In a competitive market, a 
particular contract design will only last if it meets a need, and for the length of a contract, this 
implies a trade-off between the convenience of not having to trade too frequently, and the ability 
to match a contractual position with a physical one. For example, month-long contracts will be 
well-placed in a market where demand does not change significantly from week to week, but 
does vary predictably over the course of a year.  In some electricity markets, regulators have 
mandated “vesting contracts” in the hope of reducing incumbents’ market power at the start of 
competition.  From the point of view of the firms, their length is exogenous, but such contracts 
are not a permanent market feature.  A possible extension to this work would be to ask whether 
firms wishing to collude could seek to coordinate their industry’s practice on contracts that were 
short enough not to impede collusion. 
The work does pose the question of why firms would offer contracts if they make it 
harder for the firms to collude. For some firms, the premise of the question is incorrect, for 
collusion is only possible if they have sold contracts, and in these circumstances, they would 
wish to sell the amount of contracts that maximised the collusive price that they could achieve. 
Other firms, however, will potentially lose out by selling contracts, assuming that the possibility 
of collusion is in fact an attractive one for them. In a different model, with uncertain demand, 
covering some output with forward contracts would reduce the variability of the firms’ profits.  
Hedging their profits in this way might be sufficient motivation for them to sell contracts. That 
remains an area for further research.  
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Figure 1:  
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Figure 3 
Optimal contract choices
linear case, λ = 2
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Figure 4  
Optimal contract choices
linear case, λ = 4
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Appendix: The function xˆ pc( )  
 
We can implicitly define ( ),Rm cp x p by its first order condition:  
 D pRm( ) ! xD pc( ) + pRm ! c( )"D"p pRm
= 0  (13) 
If we denote this first order condition by k and differentiate it implicitly, we obtain:  
 !p
Rm
!pc = "
kpc
kpRm
=
x #D pc( )
2 #D pRm( ) + pRm " c( ) ##D pRm( )
> 0  (14) 
 !p
Rm
!x = "
kx
kpRm
=
D pc( )
2 #D pRm( ) + pRm " c( ) ##D pRm( )
< 0  (15) 
In other words, the residual monopoly price strictly falls with x and strictly rises with pc. 
Moreover, we have pRm 0, pc( ) = pm , pRm 1, pc( ) ! pc  (for pc ≥ c), and pRm 1,c( ) = c . By 
continuity, it follows that there exists a unique xˆ pc( ) ! 0,1[ ]  such that pRm xˆ pc( ), pc( ) = pc .  
We can set pRm = pc in equation (13) and solve it directly to obtain  
 
 xˆ pc( ) = 1+
pc ! c( ) "D pc( )
D pc( )
 (16) 
 
By differentiation, we get: 
 !xˆ
!pc =
2 " xˆ( ) #D pc( ) + pc " c( ) ##D pc( )
D pc( )
< 0  (17) 
This gives us:  
 
pc ! pRm x, pc( ) "x # 0, xˆ[ ]
pc > pRm x, pc( ) "x # xˆ,1( ]
$
%
&
'&
. (18) 
 
